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Abstract	
The	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	and	its	Nagoya	Protocol	(NP)	
established	an	Access	and	Benefit	Sharing	(ABS)	system	between	utilizers	and	
providers	of	genetic	resources.	ABS	is	understood	as	a	tool	that	should	promote	
commutative	justice	between	the	involved	parties.	This	essay	discusses	what	
exactly	it	is	that	is	being	exchanged	in	the	ABS	process.	It	critically	analyses	moral	
claims	to	compensation	that	are	implied	by	the	ABS	system	for	genetic	resources.	
It	argues	that	with	the	exception	of	cases	in	which	traditional	knowledge	is	
involved,	states	are	not	automatically	entitled	to	compensation	in	return	for	the	
utilization	of	genetic	resources	growing	within	their	territory.	However,	
biodiversity-rich	states	that	make	an	effort	to	protect	biodiversity	must	be	
compensated	for	complying	with	the	requests	set	out	in	the	CBD.	Although	it	
acknowledges	that	the	NP	is	a	step	towards	recognizing	this	claim,	this	essay	
argues	that	ABS	is	not	the	appropriate	method	to	compensate	for	biodiversity	
conservation.			
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Introduction	It	is	a	declared	aim	of	the	international	community	to	achieve	fair	and	equitable	sharing	of	benefits	from	the	utilization	of	genetic	resources.	This	was	recorded	as	the	third	objective	of	the	UN	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	(UN,	1992)	and	specified	in	the	“Nagoya	Protocol	on	Access	to	Genetic	Resources	and	the	Fair	and	Equitable	Sharing	of	
Benefits	Arising	from	their	Utilization”	(NP)	(UN,	2010).	International	law	thus	tells	us	that	states	which	provide	access	to	genetic	resources	have	legal	claims	to	a	share	of	the	benefits	derived	from	their	utilization.	Ethical	reflections	on	this	idea	of	fair	and	equitable	access	and	benefit	sharing	(ABS)	often	indicate	that	it	is	considered	to	be	an	instrument	of	compensation	which	should	promote	justice	in	the	sense	of	commutative	justice	or	justice	in	exchange	(Dauda	&	Dierickx,	2013;	De	Jonge,	2011;	De	Jonge	&	Korthals,	2006;	Korthals	&	De	Jonge,	2009;	Schroeder,	2007;	Schroeder	&	Pisupati,	2010;	Stumpf,	2014).	All	of	these	theorists	have	added	that	it	is	insufficient	to	evaluate	ABS	exclusively	from	the	point	of	view	of	commutative	justice	but	that	other	dimensions	of	justice	must	be	considered	too.	Nevertheless,	this	essay	will	focus	on	the	commutative	justice	aspect	because	the	function	of	ABS	to	promote	this	type	of	justice	is	usually	taken	for	granted	without	further	scrutiny.	The	aim	of	this	study	is	to	clarify	exactly	what	is	being	exchanged	in	the	context	of	ABS	and	what	compensation	claims	are	being	implied.	This	is	not	only	an	important	point	for	theoretical	discussion	but	also	for	the	future	implementation	of	ABS	in	domestic	legislation.	As	an	ethical	reflection	on	the	CBD	and	the	NP	this	essay	critically	examines	the	moral	rather	than	legal	arguments	that	are	implied	by	the	ABS	system.	For	this	purpose,	it	examines	three	questions:	First,	what	moral	claims	to	a	share	of	the	benefits,	from	the	utilization	of	genetic	resources,	are	implied	by	ABS	in	the	CBD	and	NP;	second,	to	what	extend	can	these	claims	be	morally	justified	with	reference	to	commutative	justice;	and	third,	is	this	system	a	fair	means	to	deal	with	justified	compensation	claims	by	biodiversity-rich	states?	The	essay	starts	with	some	introductory	information	on	the	CBD	and	the	NP.	This	is	followed	by	a	brief	introduction	to	the	concept	of	commutative	justice	and	an	initial	overview	of	moral	claims	to	genetic	resources	as	they	are	implied	in	the	text	of	and	discussions	on	the	CBD	and	the	NP.	In	the	subsequent	sections,	these	claims	are	examined	in	more	detail.	For	each	claim	a	brief	scenario	exemplifies	the	type	of	exchange	concerned	and	illustrates	what	commutative	justice	requests	have	been	implied.	After	a	brief	excursion	to	review	some	related	arguments	from	other	domains	of	justice,	the	essay	closes	with	a	
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conclusion	section	that	entails	three	recommendations	on	how	the	arguments	of	this	analysis	could	be	considered	in	the	practical	implementation	of	ABS.			
The	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	and	its	Nagoya	Protocol	(NP)	The	growing	awareness	for	environmental	issues	and	commitment	to	sustainable	development	in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century	led	to	the	seminal	Rio	Earth	Summit	in	1992.	At	this	conference,	the	CBD	was	opened	for	signature.	It	was	ratified	or	accepted	by	some	190	states	and	entered	into	force	on	29	December	1993.1	The	CBD	addresses	the	problem	of	the	extinction	of	species	in	a	world	divided	between	industrialized	biodiversity-poor	states	and	developing	biodiversity-rich	states	through	three	objectives:	1.	“The	conservation	of	biological	diversity,”	2.	“The	sustainable	use	of	its	components,”	3.	“The	fair	and	equitable	sharing	of	the	benefits	arising	out	of	the	utilization	of	genetic	resources	[…]”	(CBD	Article	1).2		The	third	objective	of	the	CBD	is	specified	in	its	article	15.	The	first	paragraph	of	this	article	says:	“Recognizing	the	sovereign	rights	of	States	over	their	natural	resources,	the	authority	to	determine	access	to	genetic	resources	rests	with	the	national	governments.”	Thus,	researchers	or	industry	representatives	who	desire	to	use	genetic	resources	must	contact	the	providing	state.	Furthermore,	they	must	inform	the	providing	state	about	the	project	and	get	permission	in	the	form	of	prior	informed	consent	(PIC)	to	access	the	genetic	resource	(CBD	article	15.5).	Moreover,	they	must	share	benefits	and	profits	resulting	from	the	utilisation	of	genetic	resources	with	the	providing	state	according	to	mutually	agreed	terms	(MAT)	in	a	fair	and	equitable	way	(CBD	articles	15,	19).	In	turn,	article	15	of	the	CBD	also	specifies	that	biodiversity-rich	providing	states	should	make	an	effort	to	facilitate	access	to	genetic	resources	for	“environmentally	sound	uses.”		Developing	states	have	criticized	the	slow	implementation	of	the	third	CBD	objective	of	fair	and	equitable	benefit	sharing.	As	a	result,	after	long	and	difficult	discussions	that	took	place	over	several	years,	a	protocol	that	provides	a	more	specific	regulatory	framework	for	ABS	was	adopted	by	the	parties	to	the	CBD	at	their	tenth	meeting	in	Nagoya	in	October	2010	(Buck	&	Hamilton,	2011).	This	was	the	NP,	which																																																									1	For	more	information	see	CBD-website:	http://www.cbd.int/history/,	http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml#tab=1	(accessed	Sept	2016)	2	Because	genetic	resources	in	the	CBD	and	NP	are	discussed	in	the	context	of	biodiversity	conservation,	the	evident	objects	are	various	types	of	plants,	animals	and	microorganisms	living	in	the	natural	environment	of	humans.	In	the	official	Decision	X/1,	in	which	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	of	the	CBD	adopted	the	NP,	the	parties	explicitly	state	in	a	comment	that	human	genetic	resources	should	not	be	subject	to	the	NP	(Greiber	et	al.,	2012:	pp.71,	362).	
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entered	into	force	in	October	2014.	The	framework	outlined	by	the	NP	should	be	implemented	into	the	domestic	legislation	of	all	member	states.	The	NP	attracted	attention	for	its	particular	consideration	of	indigenous	and	local	communities.	The	request	for	dealing	with	traditional	knowledge	associated	to	genetic	resources,	which	remained	very	vague	in	the	CBD	(CBD	article	8j),	has	been	elaborated	upon	in	the	NP.	It	specifies	that,	particularly	if	the	use	of	genetic	resources	is	coupled	with	traditional	knowledge,	users	are	required	to	implement	PIC	and	MAT	not	only	involving	the	provider	state	but	also	the	concerned	indigenous	and	local	communities,	which	also	have	claims	to	benefit	sharing	(NP	articles	7,	12).			
ABS	as	a	Tool	to	Promote	Commutative	Justice	What	are	the	ethical	claims	that	underlie	the	idea	of	ABS	for	genetic	resources	as	the	core	principle	of	the	NP?	Doris	Schroeder	explains	that	the	phrase	‘benefit	sharing’	entered	international	law	with	the	CBD	(Schroeder,	2006).	She	suggests	a	definition	of	‘benefit	sharing’	for	this	context:	“Benefit-sharing	is	the	action	of	giving	a	portion	of	advantages/profits	derived	from	the	use	of	genetic	resources	or	traditional	knowledge	to	the	resource	providers,	in	order	to	achieve	justice	in	exchange”	(Schroeder,	2007).	Other	authors	too,	have	emphasized	that	fair	and	equitable	benefit	sharing	is	a	question	of	justice	in	exchange,	which	is	also	known	as	‘commutative	justice'	(Dauda	&	Dierickx,	2013;	De	Jonge,	2011;	De	Jonge	&	Korthals,	2006;	Korthals	&	De	Jonge,	2009).	This	aspect	of	justice	concerns	the	exchange	of	items	between	two	parties.	In	order	to	fulfil	the	justice	criteria,	the	exchanged	items	must	be	equivalent	(substantive	aspect)	and	there	should	not	be	any	excessive	inequalities	between	the	two	parties	(procedural	aspect).	While	emphasizing	the	aspect	of	commutative	justice,	the	authors	usually	refer	to	Aristotle,	who	distinguished	between	distributive	justice	(διανεµετικον δικαιον,	dianemetikon	dikaion)	and	another	type	of	particular	justice	(διορθοτικον δικαιον,	diorthotikon	dikaion),	which	in	English	is	usually	translated	as	rectifying	or	corrective	justice	(Aristotle,	1992:	Book	V,	Ritchie,	1894).	Rather	than	speaking	of	two	types	of	justice,	some	theorists	interpret	Aristotle	as	suggesting	a	threefold	division	of	distributive,	commutative	and	reparative	justice.3	In	this	article,	we	focus	on	commutative	justice	that	concerns	the	simultaneous	exchange	processes	and	separate	it	from	reparative	justice,	dealing	with	compensation	for	injustices	suffered	in	the	past.	It																																																									3	As	a	standard	reference	of	different	interpretations	of	Aristotle’s	understanding	of	the	different	aspects	of	particular	justice	see	(Ritchie,	1894).	
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is	not	surprising	that	commutative	justice	in	the	sense	of	a	simultaneous	exchange	has	been	discussed	as	a	key	principle	in	business	ethics.	In	the	context	of	a	market	economy,	this	type	of	justice	requires	that	each	party	receives	the	monetary	equivalent	of	service	or	wares	(Koslowski,	2001).	However,	as	indicated	above,	there	are	different	interpretations	of	commutative	justice.	Doris	Schroeder	and	Balakrishna	Pisupati	in	a	UNEP	Report	distinguish	between	an	Aristotelian	and	a	Roman	Law	understanding	of	commutative	justice.	With	the	Aristotelian	interpretation	they	refer	to	the	substantive	understanding	also	found	in	business	ethics.	This	approach	is	driven	by	the	key	question	of	whether	one	side	paid	the	proportionate	compensation	for	what	it	received	from	the	other	side.	In	contrast,	the	Roman	Law	interpretation	of	commutative	justice,	which	was	favoured	and	applied	by	Schroeder	and	Pisupati,	is	based	on	its	formal	requirements,	namely	that	both	parties	voluntarily	agree	on	the	conditions	of	the	exchange	procedure	(Schroeder	&	Pisupati,	2010).	This	article	focuses	on	the	substantive	aspect	of	commutative	justice.	It	examines	exactly	what	is	being	exchanged	in	the	ABS	system.	What	is	it	that	the	provider	countries	are	compensated	for	in	the	Nagoya	Protocol?	ABS	can	only	serve	as	a	tool	to	promote	commutative	justice	if	the	compensation	claims	that	it	addresses	can	be	justified	by	commutative	justice.	Procedural	questions,	such	as	whether	indigenous	peoples	have	been	appropriately	considered,	are	not	the	focus	here	mainly	because	addressing	this	type	of	question	would	go	far	beyond	commutative	justice.	Nevertheless,	the	issue	of	justice	towards	indigenous	and	local	communities	will	be	touched	upon	in	various	contexts	in	this	article.	The	question	of	what	it	is	that	provider	countries	receive	compensation	for	under	the	ABS	system,	will	be	addressed	by	examining	four	suggestions	that	are	implicitly	assumed	in	the	text	and	context	of	the	CBD	and	its	NP.	The	basic	structure	of	the	related	arguments	is	introduced	using	four	general	scenarios.	In	short,	the	scenarios	are	based	on	the	following	observations	that	will	be	established	in	more	detail	as	the	essay	proceeds:	The	NP	is	often	mentioned	in	the	context	of	biopiracy.	The	idea	that	ABS	could	serve	as	a	tool	to	deal	with	this	issue	is	taken	up	by	the	first	scenario	of	‘A	share	of	benefits	for	active	contribution’.	The	fact	that	genetic	resources	are	discussed	as	a	type	of	biological-	and	thus	natural	resource	is	considered	by	the	second	scenario:	‘compensation	for	passive	contribution’.	A	more	modest	interpretation	of	the	contribution	by	the	provider	of	genetic	resources	would	speak	of	assistance	as	outlined	in	scenario	three:	‘compensation	for	assistance’.	Finally,	the	integration	of	the	ABS	
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system	in	the	CBD	suggests	that	it	may	be	understood	as	a	reward	for	conservation	of	biodiversity	in	the	sense	of	scenario	four:	‘compensation	for	compliance	with	a	request’.			
Compensation	for	Active	Contribution	The	NP	is	expected	to	prevent	future	cases	of	biopiracy	by	providing	a	framework	in	which	such	cases	would	be	illegal	and	would	thus	be	subject	to	prosecution	(Kamau,	Fedder,	&	Winter,	2010).	The	biopiracy	cases	that	are	brought	forward	to	illustrate	the	problem	are	usually	examples	in	which	large	pharmaceutical	companies	develop	profitable	products	based	on	traditional	knowledge.	These	examples	are	characterized	by	the	fact	that	the	development	of	a	pharmaceutical	was	triggered	by	the	observation	that	indigenous	people	used	the	active	compound	in	question	to	treat	a	medical	condition.	The	cases	of	the	Hoodia	cactus	and	the	Neem	tree	are	amongst	the	most	widely	discussed	examples	of	biopiracy.	The	Hoodia-case	involves	traditional	knowledge	of	the	South	African	San	people	about	the	appetite-suppressing	effects	of	the	Hoodia	cactus	(Beattie,	2005;	Wynberg,	2005).	In	the	case	of	the	Neem	tree,	knowledge	of	indigenous	Indian	people	about	the	medical	benefits	of	this	tree	has	been	exploited	(Biswas	et	al.,	2002;	Sheridan,	2005).	These	two	biopiracy	cases	attracted	considerable	attention	and	were	widely	criticised	by	commentators.	What	kind	of	moral	justification	can	explain	compensation	claims	by	indigenous	communities	to	a	share	of	the	benefits?	In	the	Hoodia-	and	Neem	cases	the	indigenous	communities	actively	contributed	to	the	development	of	the	actual	or	potential	drugs	by	providing	the	key	idea	for	the	development	of	the	product.	Active	contribution	is	understood	in	this	essay	as	intellectual	or	manual	participation	in	the	production	and	design	process.	This	form	of	contribution	can	be	exemplified	and	justified	using	the	first	scenario:		
Scenario	one:	Compensation	for	active	contribution:	People	merit	a	share	of	the	benefits	when	they	actively	contributed	to	the	result	or	product	that	generated	the	benefits	in	question.	If	person	A	contributes	to	person	B’s	design	or	production	of	a	machine	that	generates	a	profitable	product	or	that	can	be	sold	for	a	good	price,	A	is	entitled	to	some	of	these	benefits	because	A’s	contribution	was	necessary	for	the	success	of	the	product.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	B	used	A’s	idea	makes	it	much	more	difficult	for	A	to	use	the	idea	herself.	The	extent	of	this	claim	depends	on	the	contribution	and	the	condition	under	which	A’s	work	has	been	used.	This	entitlement	is	the	basic	argument	for	a	patent	system	according	
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to	which	person	B	must	pay	royalties	to	person	A	if	B	uses	A’s	work	for	which	A	has	a	patent.		The	intellectual	property	right	system	thus	rewards	active	contributions	in	the	sense	of	innovation.	However,	traditional	knowledge	cannot	be	protected	by	the	classical	patent	system,	because	patents	are	usually	granted	for	novel	inventions	and	they	are	valid	only	for	a	limited	amount	of	time.	Nevertheless,	it	seems	to	be	unjust	in	the	commutative	sense	that	a	community	whose	traditional	knowledge	provided	the	idea	to	use	a	specific	plant	for	the	development	of	a	successful	product	should	go	away	empty-handed.	ABS	as	established	in	the	CBD	and	the	NP	is	a	tool	to	compensate	the	providers	of	traditional	knowledge	for	their	active	contributions	with	or	without	reference	to	the	patent	system.		An	objection	that	was	brought	forward	against	the	moral	justification	of	intellectual	property	rights	for	traditional	knowledge	might	also	be	applied	against	ABS.	Adapted	to	our	context,	the	argument	says	that	if	required	to	share	benefits	with	indigenous	communities	for	the	utilization	of	their	traditional	knowledge,	then	as	a	matter	of	consistency	the	traditional	knowledge	of	‘Western’	cultures	would	have	to	be	rewarded	too.	Therefore,	the	critics	suggest,	all	types	of	traditional	knowledge	should	be	considered	to	be	common	property	(Anwander,	Bachmann,	Rippe,	&	Schaber,	2002:	pp96-97).	A	system	that	requires	benefit	sharing	for	all	Western	traditions	would	indeed	be	impracticable.	The	biopiracy	examples	mentioned	above	differ,	however,	from	cases	where	companies	in	industrialized	states	produce	products	based	on	traditional	knowledge	from	their	own	countries.	As	an	example,	let	us	think	of	the	utilization	of	the	traditional	knowledge	about	the	anti	cold	effect	of	Alpine	herbs	for	the	industrial	production	of	herb	candy	or	medical	treatments	against	coughing.	The	utilization	of	this	knowledge	can	be	seen	as	part	of	the	general	development	within	‘Western’	culture,	from	which	also	the	community	that	provided	the	knowledge	profits	at	least	indirectly.	Members	of	Alpine	communities	can	profit	from	the	candy	and	anti	cold	drugs	and	from	the	general	lifestyle	achievable	in	industrialized	states.	In	this	case,	at	least	the	non-monetary	benefit	sharing	with	the	traditional	community	is	thus	part	of	the	general	development	of	the	product.	In	contrast,	indigenous	knowledge	about	Hoodia	or	the	Neem	tree	was	transferred	from	the	indigenous	people	to	the	‘Western’	culture.	Some	actors	made	(or	are	expected	to	make)	financial	profits	from	this	knowledge;	whereas,	the	traditional	communities	neither	received	any	direct	financial	profits	nor	enjoyed	the	general	lifestyle	to	which	they	contributed	their	knowledge.	Therefore,	it	seems	to	be	
	 7	
unfair	to	regard	their	traditional	knowledge	as	‘common	property’.	It	is	another	question	for	how	long	and	to	what	extent	a	community	should	be	compensated	for	a	specific	case	of	traditional	knowledge.	At	some	point	the	community	may	have	been	compensated	sufficiently	for	providing	this	knowledge	and	it	may	be	legitimate	to	consider	the	medical	effect	of	the	plant	in	question	as	common	knowledge.		Based	on	the	same	reflections,	the	‘compensation	rights’	warranted	by	patents	expire	after	20	years.	If	my	discussion	of	these	cases	is	correct,	reference	to	commutative	justice	can	thus	legitimize	ABS	with	indigenous	communities	that	provided	traditional	knowledge,	because	these	communities	must	be	compensated	for	their	active	contribution	to	the	final	product.	In	a	similar	vein,	providing	access	to	traditional	crops	or	other	domesticated	plants	or	animals	amounts	to	active	contribution	to	the	final	product.	In	these	cases,	genetic	resources	are	not	a	classical	type	of	natural	resource	since	they	have	been	shaped	by	human	invention	and	work	for	which	commutative	justice	requests	compensation.	The	question	that	follows	this	conclusion	concerns	cases	in	which	no	traditional	knowledge	or	active	contribution	by	local	breeders	is	involved.	Can	the	entitlement	to	benefits	for	providing	access	to	natural	genetic	resources	growing	within	the	territory	of	a	state	also	be	classified	as	an	active	contribution	to	the	final	product?	If	‘active	contribution’	is	understood	as	intellectual	or	manual	participation,	which	is	the	theory	underlying	this	argument,	providing	territorial	access	to	genetic	resources	in	itself	cannot	count	as	an	active	contribution.	In	these	cases,	the	entitlement	to	a	share	of	the	benefits	can	thus	not	be	morally	justified	with	reference	to	the	first	scenario.		
Compensation	for	Passive	Contribution		The	previous	scenario	described	compensation	claims	that	could	justify	ABS	based	on	an	
active	contribution	in	the	production	process.	However,	the	exchange	addressed	by	commutative	justice	could	also	concern	a	contribution	without	active	involvement;	for	instance,	by	supplying	raw	material,	tools	or	other	auxiliary	means.	I	am	speaking	of	
passive	contribution	in	this	context.	The	second	scenario	illustrates	how	commutative	justice	could	request	a	share	of	the	benefits	of	a	product	in	exchange	for	passive	contribution:	
Scenario	two:	Compensation	for	passive	contribution:	Passive	contribution	to	a	production	process	can	consist	of	supplying	material	that	is	required	throughout	the	production	process.	If	person	A	owns	the	raw	material	that	person	B	uses	to	
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make	a	profitable	product,	or	if	A	owns	an	instrument	or	other	auxiliary	means	with	which	B	generates	a	profitable	product,	person	A	is	entitled	to	a	share	of	the	resulting	benefits.	Comparable	to	the	first	scenario,	the	success	of	the	product	was	owed	to	a	specific	input	by	A	and	the	fact	that	B	took	advantage	of	A’s	property	made	it	more	difficult	for	A	to	produce	the	same	product	(at	the	same	time).	The	extent	of	these	claims	depends	on	the	circumstances.		The	supply	of	classical	natural	resources	as	raw	material	is	a	good	example	of	passive	contribution.	The	CBD	and	NP	treat	genetic	resources	as	a	type	of	natural	resource.	This	is	suggested	by	the	NP’s	reference	to	the	‘exercise	of	sovereign	rights	over	natural	resources’	(NP	article	6)	and	even	more	specifically	when	the	CBD	classifies	‘genetic	resources’	as	a	type	of	biological	resource	(CBD	article	2),	which	in	turn	are	generally	understood	to	be	renewable	but	depletable	natural	resources	(Paavola,	2008).	However,	can	providing	genetic	resources	count	as	a	passive	contribution	analogous	to	supplying	biological	raw	material	such	as	timber?			
Genetic	Resources	as	a	Special	Type	of	Natural	Resource	It	is	characteristic	that	a	constant	supply	of	the	natural	resource	in	question	is	requested	for	the	manufacturing	process.	If	genetic	resources	belong	to	the	category	of	natural	resources	in	the	classical	sense,	we	expect	that	a	constant	supply	of	organisms	carrying	the	requested	genes	from	the	country	of	origin	would	be	required.	Let	us	assume	that	a	pharmaceutical	company	has	performed	a	prospecting	project	in	the	rainforest	of	another	country.	In	this	project	a	biological	compound	derived	from	a	plant	was	discovered	to	have	an	antibiotic	effect.	The	company	thus	plans	to	produce	a	new	type	of	antibiotic	drug,	let	us	call	it	‘NO	BUG’,	based	on	this	biological	compound.	The	company	will	certainly	try	to	use	a	method	that	does	not	depend	on	a	constant	supply	of	the	respective	plant	from	its	natural	habitat.	Strategies	include	first,	growing	the	plant	in	cultures,	which	are	likely	not	located	in	the	country	of	origin	but	at	a	place	convenient	for	the	company.	Second,	producers	will	try	to	avoid	extracting	the	compound	of	interest	from	plants	by	manufacturing	the	product	using	genetically	modified	organisms	or,	as	a	third	strategy,	they	will	try	to	produce	the	compound	by	chemical	synthesis.	These	strategies	do	not	depend	on	a	constant	supply	from	the	country	of	origin.	The	genetic	resources	obtained	from	this	country	can	thus	not	be	understood	as	the	raw	material	of	the	resulting	product.	Instead,	the	original	natural	organism	that	was	discovered	in	the	country	of	origin	could	be	regarded	as	a	natural	inspiration	or	instruction	towards	the	
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final	product.	If	genetically	modified	organisms	are	used,	the	genetic	sequence	is	the	valuable	information;	in	the	case	of	chemical	synthesis	it	is	the	structure	or	composition	of	the	useful	compound.	If	this	inspirational	or	instructive	function	of	genetic	resources	cannot	count	as	raw	material,	should	it	then	be	classified	as	auxiliary	means	or	a	tool	for	production?	In	order	to	address	this	question	it	may	be	helpful	to	think	of	other	examples	in	which	natural	resources	serve	as	auxiliary	means.	Fossil	fuels	could,	for	instance,	be	assigned	to	this	category.	Although	petroleum	can	also	serve	as	a	raw	material,	for	example,	for	the	production	of	plastics,	it	serves	as	an	auxiliary	means	if	it	is	used	to	provide	energy.	How	do	these	examples	relate	to	genetic	resources?	Let	us	go	back	to	the	hypothetical	drug	NO	BUG,	of	which	we	assume	that	the	pharmaceutical	company	produces	the	key	compound	by	chemical	synthesis.	Unlike	petroleum	as	an	auxiliary	means,	this	chemical	synthesis	does	not	require	any	material	samples	from	the	original	plant.	In	contrast	to	a	machine,	which,	even	though	not	consumed,	is	still	required	throughout	the	production	process,	the	plant	(the	genetic	resource	in	this	example)	is	not	requested	during	production.	Instead,	it	provided	the	biochemical	
information	necessary	to	produce	the	antibiotic	NO	BUG.	Rather	than	being	a	type	of	raw	material	or	auxiliary	means	or	a	tool,	genetic	resources	thus	seem	to	be	a	source	of	information,	or,	in	other	words,	forms	of	non-material,	informational	natural	resources.4	A	significant	difference	in	the	resource-product	relation	of	genetic	resources	compared	to	other	types	of	natural	resources	has	thus	been	detected.	Bram	De	Jonge	argues	that	due	to	this	particular	informational	nature,	genetic	resources	are	non-rival	in	the	sense	that	everybody	can	profit	from	them	independently	whether	or	not	others	have	used	them	before.	He	suggests	it	is	exactly	because	of	this	property	that	it	is	particularly	important	to	ensure	that	a	fair	exchange	occurs	between	the	two	parties,	which	is	one	of	the	aims	of	ABS	(De	Jonge,	2011).	De	Jonge	seems	to	focus	mainly	on	cases	involving	traditional	knowledge	or	active	contribution	by	local	breeders.	In	these	cases,	compensation	claims	based	on	the	first	scenario	are	involved.	However,	at	this	place	in	the	essay	I	examine	genetic	resources	as	natural	resources	without	any	particular	contribution	by	the	donor.5		
																																																								4	In	the	case	of	growing	natural	plants	in	culture,	the	interpretation	of	the	original	organisms	as	information	may	be	a	bit	more	far-fetched,	but	it	can	be	understood	as	the	information	stored	in	seeds.	Even	in	these	cases,	the	plant-supply	is	usually	not	bound	to	the	country	of	origin,	because	‘the	information’	can	be	used	to	grow	and	multiply	the	raw	material	elsewhere.	5	For	some	additional	reflections	on	the	rival	/	non-rival	nature	of	genetic	resources,	see,	also	footnote	10.	
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This	section	suggested	that	contributing	genetic	resources	could	not	count	as	a	passive	contribution	in	the	sense	of	supplying	material.	However,	there	is	a	possibility	that	contributing	a	non-material	natural	resource	could	also	trigger	compensation	claims	based	on	commutative	justice.	This	could	be	a	passive	contribution	comparable	to	a	situation	where	someone	supplies	a	central	piece	of	information	that	was	not	accessible	to	others	but	that	is	not	dependent	on	any	intellectual	input	by	the	supplier.	Who	could	make	such	a	contribution	in	the	context	of	genetic	resources?	Two	possible	answers	could	be	given:	either	the	owner	of	the	genetic	resources	or	the	holder	of	the	sovereign	rights	over	these	resources.			
Ownership	of	Genetic	Resources	This	section	addresses	the	question	of	whether	states	that	enter	ABS	negotiations,	as	suggested	by	the	NP,	can	count	as	the	owners	of	the	genetic	resources	with	morally	legitimate	property	claims.		As	mentioned	above,	in	most	cases,	genetic	resources	can	be	understood	as	non-material	informative	means	towards	production.6		Property-rights	for	non-material	information	are	known	as	intellectual	property	rights.	However,	these	rights	are	bound	to	intellectual	contribution	and	thus	fall	into	the	category	discussed	in	the	previous	section.	Natural	information	has	been	discovered	rather	than	invented.	This	puts	into	question	the	claim	that	natural	genetic	information	should	be	subject	to	intellectual	property	rights	(Anwander	et	al.,	2002:	pp	53-63;	Nuffield	council,	2002).	Moreover,	one	may	wonder,	why	the	state	on	whose	territory	the	information	was	discovered	should	be	entitled	to	particular	property	rights,	since	information	is	not	bound	to	any	territory.	This	also	holds	for	information	that	is	carried	by	tokens	of	living	organisms.	In	many	cases,	these	organisms	may	have	invaded	the	region,	in	which	they	were	found.	Samples	of	the	organism	may	be	found	in	ex	situ	collections.	What	binds	the	genetic	information	to	the	state,	in	which	it	was	originally	found?	It	is	not	even	bound	to	the	individual	organism.	DNA	can	be	extracted,	multiplied	and	distributed	in	the	form	of	chemical	extracts.	Thanks	to	ongoing	technological	progress,	the	DNA	sequence	of	more	and	more	organisms	is	known	and	kept	in	non-material,	abstract	form.	Besides	genetic	information,	another	example	of	the	utilization	of	natural	information	is	biomimetics.	Biomimetics	stands	for	the	inspiration	to	enhance	technological	innovations	by	shapes																																																									6	The	idea	that	the	very	first	resource	organism	that	was	used	to	collect	the	genetic	information	may	have	been	material	state-property	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section	‘compensation	for	assistance’.	
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or	mechanisms	in	nature;	this	often-used	type	of	natural	information	has	always	been	considered	to	be	openly	available.	States,	in	which	the	respective	organisms	can	be	found,	are	not	considered	to	be	entitled	to	participate	in	the	benefit	sharing	from	the	utilization	of	this	information.	Why	should	genetic	information	be	treated	differently	from	the	information	used	in	biomimetics?	The	characterisation	of	genetic	resources	as	natural,	informational	and	as	detached	from	the	territory	in	which	they	were	found	thus	suggests	that	there	cannot	be	any	legitimate	property	rights	over	natural	genetic	resources.7	This	leaves	us	with	the	question	of	whether	instead	of	property	rights	state	sovereignty	might	serve	as	a	foundation	for	compensation	claims	in	exchange	for	contributing	genetic	resources.	
	
	
State	Sovereignty	over	Genetic	Resources	The	CBD	and	its	NP	apply	the	concept	of	state	sovereignty	over	natural	resources	to	genetic	resources	(CBD	articles	3,	15,	NP	article	6).	However,	in	spite	of	its	legal	significance,	the	moral	legitimation	of	state	sovereignty	over	natural	resources	is	not	straightforward	and	has	been	critically	discussed	by	different	authors.8	Even	if	the	concept	of	state	sovereignty	over	material	natural	resources	is	accepted,	it	cannot	be	directly	extended	to	genetic	resources.	Claims	to	the	benefits	from	the	use	of	genetic	resources	drawing	from	state	sovereignty	are	based	on	an	understanding	of	resource	rights	as	territorial	rights.	This	essay	tried	to	establish,	though,	that	in	the	case	of	genetic	resources,	the	actual	resource	is	a	type	of	information,	which	is	not	bound	to	any	territory,	and	over	which	it	thus	seems	to	be	difficult	to	establish	territorial	rights.	Only	a	small	sample	of	territory-bound	biological	material	is	required.	Moreover,	Baruch	Brody	criticizes	that	the	extension	of	the	concept	of	‘state	sovereignty	over	natural	resources’	to	genetic	resources	applies	the	concept	to	the	utilization	of	genetic	information	abstracted	from	the	biological	material	outside	the	‘sovereign’	country	of	origin.	This	extension	goes	beyond	the	usual	sphere	of	influence	of	state	sovereignty	(Brody,	2010).		This	paragraph	thus	suggests	that	an	interpretation	of	state	sovereignty	over	genetic	resources	that	understands	the	state	as	the	donor	of	immaterial	informational																																																									7	This	argument	does	not	hold	for	crops	that	were	cultivated	by	selective	breeding.	As	discussed	in	context	of	the	previous	scenario,	cultivated	crops	have	been	shaped	by	humans;	I	would	thus	not	count	them	as	examples	of	natural	resources.		8	See	for	instance	(Armstrong,	2014;	Schuppert,	2014).	
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genetic	resources	with	compensation	claims	based	on	commutative	justice	is	highly	problematic.		If	the	arguments	in	this	chapter	are	correct,	passive	contribution	in	the	context	of	genetic	resources	is	an	inapplicable	scenario	because	genetic	resources	are	incomparable	to	raw	material	of	which	a	constant	supply	is	requested.	Moreover,	due	to	their	informational,	non-material	and	non-territorial	nature,	neither	owners	nor	holders	of	state	sovereignty	can	count	as	contributors	of	genetic	resources	in	an	exchange	process.	Therefore,	reference	to	the	scenario	of	passive	contribution	cannot	justify	moral	claims	to	a	share	of	the	benefits	derived	from	genetic	resources	for	provider	states.	In	the	preceding	section	of	this	article,	it	was	suggested	that	only	in	cases	involving	traditional	knowledge	or	contribution	by	local	breeders,	can	benefit	sharing	be	justified	by	referring	to	an	active	contribution.	I	thus	conclude	that	a	state	that	simply	provides	access	to	the	natural	genetic	resources	growing	on	its	territory	does	not	have	compensation	claims	based	on	a	direct	contribution	to	the	success	of	the	product.	Nevertheless,	a	state	that	allows	a	company	or	research	institution	to	enter	state-territory	in	order	to	study	or	collect	biological	material	seems	to	have	claims	to	compensation	for	this	gesture.	These	claims	and	their	relation	to	ABS	in	the	CBD	and	NP	are	addressed	with	the	next	section.			
Compensation	for	Assistance		If	state	sovereignty	over	genetic	resources	does	not	mean	that	the	state	is	the	contributor	of	the	genetic	resources,	how	else	could	it	be	understood?	‘State	sovereignty’	could	be	interpreted	–as	implied	by	Brody	(Brody,	2010)–	to	stand	for	the	territorial	right	to	self-determination.	This	includes	the	right	to	control	entry	into	state	territory	and	actions	that	take	place	within	that	territory.	If	a	state	with	this	right	allows	companies	or	research	groups	to	enter	its	biodiversity-rich	territory	in	order	to	study	or	collect	biological	material,	this	is	a	form	of	cooperation	and	assistance.	As	a	matter	of	commutative	justice,	the	state	providing	access	should	get	something	in	return	for	this	assistance.	This	idea	is	exemplified	by	the	third	scenario:	
Scenario	three:	Compensation	for	assistance:	This	is	a	type	of	return	service	for	a	short	and	small	involvement	that	does	not	amount	to	a	contribution.	Person	A	gives	person	B	a	useful	hint	or	helps	B	in	a	situation.	If	A	and	B	are,	for	instance,	in	a	commercial	relationship,	this	type	of	assistance	justifies	compensation	adapted	to	the	size	of	the	favour.	Assistance	of	this	kind	could	consist	in	lending	
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property	in	an	emergency	situation,	but	unlike	the	case	of	passive	contribution,	this	assistance	is	of	short	duration.	It	is	not	required	as	a	constant	condition	for	the	profitable	enterprise.	In	comparison	to	active	contribution,	assistance	is	less	significant,	innovative	and	path-breaking.		As	indicated	above,	this	essay	deals	with	the	question	of	what	providers	of	genetic	resources	are	entitled	to	be	compensated	for	in	the	context	of	ABS	in	the	CBD	and	its	NP.	Such	a	substantive	understanding	of	commutative	justice	entails	the	difficulty	of	confronting	the	incommensurable	offers	made	by	the	two	parties	involved	in	the	exchange.	It	is	certainly	not	the	aim	of	this	study	to	make	any	general	suggestions	as	to	how	to	determine	appropriate	compensations	in	such	cases.	However,	the	NP	makes	some	rather	substantive	suggestions	concerning	the	benefits	that	might	be	offered	and	thereby	sets	some	standards	for	ABS	negotiations.	It	is	thus	important	to	put	these	suggestions	in	relation	to	what	is	being	offered	by	the	biodiversity-rich	side	in	the	exchange.	In	the	previous	sections	of	this	essay	it	has	been	suggested	that,	if	no	traditional	knowledge	or	active	contribution	by	local	breeders	is	involved,	the	offer	is	simply	a	one-time	access	to	a	territory	with	the	permission	to	collect	a	specific	type	of	information.	However,	it	might	be	countered	that	in	order	to	be	able	to	extract	this	information	some	biological	material	must	be	removed,	and	that	even	if	the	genetic	information	is	not	the	property	of	the	providing	state,	the	removed	material	may	be.	Even	if	it	is	taken	into	account	that	such	a	biological	sample	may	be	the	property	of	the	state	of	origin,	it	is	still	questionable	whether	providing	one-time	access	to	such	a	sample	justifies	the	rather	extensive	requests	for	various	payments,	joined	ownership	in	property	rights	and	various	non-monetary	benefits	listed	in	the	Nagoya	Protocol.	The	insight	that	these	benefits	are	offered	in	the	exchange	for	assistance	and	not	for	any	active	or	passive	contribution	seems	to	require	reconsideration	of	benefit-claims.		Finally,	independent	of	the	extent	of	the	benefits,	one	may	wonder	whether	it	is	fair	to	bind	compensation	for	providing	access	to	state-territory	to	the	success	of	the	industrial	project,	for	which	access	has	been	granted.	If	the	answer	to	this	question	were	negative,	at	least	some	of	the	benefits	suggested	by	the	NP	require	reconsideration.		
Compensation	for	Compliance	with	a	Request	If	my	argument	hitherto	is	correct,	it	may	surprise	many	that	the	NP	has	been	signed	and	ratified	by	a	large	number	of	states.	I	will	argue	that	this	broad	approval	of	the	NP	is	based	on	the	aim	of	providing	commutative	justice	at	another	level;	namely,	to	
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compensate	those	countries	that	conserve	biodiversity	for	complying	with	the	request	by	the	international	community.	Rather	than	offering	a	share	of	the	benefits	in	return	for	providing	access	to	genetic	resources,	commutative	justice	so	understood,	demands	the	possibility	to	profit	from	the	ABS	system	in	return	for	the	commitment	to	conserve	biodiversity.9	The	basic	idea	of	such	a	justification	scenario	is	the	following:		
Scenario	four:	Compensation	for	compliance	with	a	request:	People	who	follow	requests	made	by	others	may	be	entitled	to	compensation.	If	person	A	exerts	time	and	energy	to	fulfil	the	request	made	by	person	B	of	cleaning	the	building	in	which	person	B	generates	a	product,	person	A	should	be	compensated	for	this	work.	The	size	of	this	compensation	should	not	depend	on	whether	the	product	can	be	sold	or	not,	since	compensation	is	paid	for	complying	with	the	request	in	question.	Unless	this	request	is	directly	linked	to	the	success	of	the	product	(e.g.	a	request	for	advertising),	it	can	be	fulfilled	and	thus	results	in	entitlements,	independently	of	how	the	product	sells.	So	far,	the	discussion	of	the	NP	in	this	essay	has	omitted	a	central	aspect	of	the	protocol,	namely	its	integration	in	the	CBD.	As	mentioned	in	the	beginning,	the	NP	specifies	one	of	the	three	major	objectives	of	the	CBD.	The	other	two	objectives	are:	1)	the	conservation	of	biological	diversity	and	2)	the	sustainable	use	of	its	components.	This	suggests	that	the	request	of	ABS	for	genetic	resources	needs	to	be	understood	in	the	context	of	the	other	objectives.	In	that	sense,	biodiversity-rich	states,	which	follow	the	request	of	the	industrialized	world	to	conserve	biodiversity	and	make	an	effort	towards	sustainable	development,	are	entitled	to	compensation.	Due	to	its	intuitive	persuasiveness,	not	much	space	will	be	lost	here	to	argue	in	favour	of	this	claim.	Instead,	the	essay	examines	whether	an	ABS	system	is	a	fair	means	to	address	it.		One	problem	with	ABS	in	this	respect	is	that	benefits	are	available	only	for	those	states	in	which	companies	or	research	teams	wish	to	access	biodiversity.	Furthermore,	some	of	the	suggested	benefits	such	as	payment	of	royalties	or	licence	fees	only	result	in	profit	if	the	user	was	successful	in	developing	a	lucrative	product	from	the	genetic	resource	in	question.	Such	success-related	benefits	seem	to	be	justified	in	exchange	for	an	active	or	passive	contribution	since	the	quality	of	the	contribution	is	a	factor	deciding	the	extent	of	success.	However,	as	compensation	for	compliance	with	a	request	that	does																																																									9	The	idea	that	the	NP	should	compensate	biodiversity-rich	states	for	conserving	biodiversity	also	played	a	role	in	the	negotiations	of	the	NP	(Oberthür	&	Rosendal,	2013;	Wallbott,	Wolff,	&	Pozarowska,	2013)		
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not	concern	the	production	process	itself,	these	success-related	benefits	are	problematic.	If	the	purpose	of	the	third	objective	of	the	CBD	is	to	compensate	states	for	fulfilling	their	commitment	to	biodiversity	conservation	and	sustainable	development,	the	same	compensation	should	be	granted	to	all	states	that	make	similar	efforts.	This	should	be	independent	of	whether	a	company	launches	any	projects	involving	genetic	resources	of	that	country	and	even	more	independent	of	the	success	of	such	projects.	As	it	is,	the	third	objective	of	the	CBD	favours	states	with	dense	occurrence	of	biodiversity,	which	is	particularly	interesting	for	companies	that	search	for	potent	natural	compounds.	Conservation	of	biodiversity	is,	however,	also	important	in	commercially	less	promising	areas,	for	instance	in	deserts,	which	also	contain	endangered	species	and	are	of	high	ecological,	aesthetic,	instrumental	or	other	value.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	some	type	of	project	is	being	performed	in	one	state	may	render	another	state	with	a	similar	biodiversity	profile	less	interesting	for	companies	that	wish	to	undergo	a	comparable	project.	In	such	a	case,	only	one	state	could	profit	from	benefits,	even	though	all	of	them	are	expected	to	conserve	and	protect	biodiversity.10	Finally,	the	ABS	system	favours	states	with	governments	focusing	on	relations	with	industry	and	research	institutions	rather	than	those	focusing	on	conservation	projects.	An	ABS	system	thus	seems	not	to	be	a	fair	compensation	for	compliance	with	the	request	for	biodiversity	conservation.	A	more	pragmatic	than	moral	argument	in	favour	of	using	ABS	as	a	compensation	for	conserving	biodiversity	suggests	that	it	could	provide	an	incentive	to	protect	biodiversity.	If,	however,	opportunities	for	benefits	through	this	system	turn	out	to	be	lower	than	expected,	this	may	reduce	the	motivation	to	conserve	biodiversity.	Disappointment	with	respect	to	the	potential	magnitude	of	benefits	may	be	caused	by	disproportionate	expectations	that	were	associated	with	bioprospecting	projects	in	the	1990s,	when	the	CBD	was	ratified.	In	the	meantime,	the	paradigm	example	of	ABS	between	the	industrial	company	Merck	and	Costa	Rica’s	National	Biodiversity	Institut	INbio	was	abandoned	without	the	discovery	of	any	new	rewarding	pharmaceutical	(Conniff,	2012).	This	example	illustrates	that	the	road	from	a	potentially	promising	
																																																								10	In	that	sense,	and	in	contrast	to	De	Jonge’s	observation	(De	Jonge,	2011),	genetic	resources	are	even	more	rival	or	excludable	than	material	types	of	natural	resources,	where	all	states	with	incidences	of	the	resource	in	question	can	profit	from	the	demand	created	by	the	first	user.	Joseph	Millum	refers	to	the	same	point	when	he	notices	that	the	sale	of	the	information	entailed	in	the	genetic	resources	on	the	land	of	one	landowner	reduces	the	value	of	the	same	genetic	resource	on	the	land	of	others	(Millum,	2010).	
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natural	compound	to	a	pharmaceutical	blockbuster	is	longer	and	success	in	this	development	probably	less	frequent	than	envisioned.		Another	problem	when	using	ABS	as	a	compensation	mechanism	for	compliance	with	the	request	of	conserving	biodiversity	concerns	the	contract	partners,	which	act	at	different	levels.	Partners	in	the	ABS	negotiations	are	usually	representatives	of	the	biodiversity-providing	country	on	the	one	side,	and	research	institutions	or	companies	interested	in	utilizing	biodiversity	on	the	other	side.	In	contrast,	it	is	the	international	community	that	requests	conservation	of	biodiversity	and	sustainable	development	in	the	CBD	and	NP.	Using	the	ABS	as	compensation	shifts	the	responsibility	to	compensate	states	for	complying	with	the	international	community’s	requests	to	research	institutions	and	companies,	which	are	not	the	actors	who	made	these	requests.	This	is	not	to	say	that	companies	who	profit	from	genetic	resources	should	be	discharged	from	any	environmental	responsibility,	but	this	is	not	directly	related	to	the	duty	of	compensating	states	that	comply	with	requests	of	the	international	community.		In	sum,	the	application	of	the	fourth	scenario	to	the	context	of	ABS	in	the	CBD	and	its	NP	concerns	a	different	type	of	exchange	other	than	the	application	of	the	previous	scenarios.	Rather	than	justifying	claims	to	benefits	in	return	for	providing	access	to	genetic	resources,	the	fourth	scenario	has	been	applied	to	explain	claims	from	biodiversity-rich	states	to	be	compensated	for	complying	with	the	requests	set	forth	in	objectives	1	and	2	of	the	CBD.	These	seem	to	be	valid	claims	based	on	commutative	justice.	However,	the	ABS	system	seems	to	be	an	unfair	means	to	address	them	because	it	only	compensates	a	subgroup	of	those	who	comply	with	the	requests	in	question.	
	
A	Brief	Excurse	to	Other	Justice	Arguments	for	ABS	The	presented	analysis	of	ABS	in	the	CBD	and	its	NP	from	the	point	of	view	of	substantial	commutative	justice	may	trigger	responses	that	touch	other	justice	dimensions.	This	chapter	will	briefly	address	some	of	these	arguments.	However,	I	will	not	be	able	to	address	these	topics	in	detail	and	do	not	wish	to	make	any	general	conclusion	as	to	whether	ABS	is	an	appropriate	tool	to	promote	justice	in	the	non-commutative	sense.		
Reparative	Justice	As	mentioned	before,	some	authors	discuss	reparative	justice	as	a	type	of	commutative	justice	because	it	also	concerns	a	type	of	exchange	albeit	with	the	particularity	that	
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compensation	is	paid	in	exchange	for	something	that	happened	in	the	past.11	The	ABS	system	has	mainly	been	requested	by	developing	states	often	with	a	colonial	past.	It	is	well	known	that	in	the	16th	-20th	century,	colonial	regimes	not	only	promulgated	domination	and	suppression	of	the	inhabitants	of	colonized	nations	(which	included	many	biodiversity-rich	states)	but	also	the	exploitation	of	their	natural	resources.	The	colonial	rulers	profited	from	valuable	land,	lumber,	gems	or	ores	and	in	addition	from	indigenous	labour.	Generally,	the	colonies	did	not	get	a	fair	share	of	the	benefits	derived	from	their	resources.	It	could	thus	be	argued	that	benefits	paid	by	utilizers	of	genetic	resources	to	biodiversity-rich	states	are	justified	as	reparation	for	historical	wrongs	that	the	latter	have	suffered.	Even	today,	developing	states	are	economically	and	politically	highly	dependent	on	industrialized	nations,	a	situation,	which	is	described	as	‘Neocolonialism’.	The	CBD	and	its	NP	could	be	understood	as	a	tool	to	fight	this	type	of	injustice.	Many	of	the	biodiversity-rich	states	that	would	profit	from	ABS	have	indisputably	suffered	serious	injustices	from	the	colonial	and	neo-colonial	systems.	However,	reparation	for	these	wrongs	should	be	paid	to	all	and	not	only	to	those	that	are	rich	in	biodiversity	and	can	provide	access	to	genetic	resources.	Therefore,	ABS	in	the	CBD	and	its	NP	is	neither	a	fair	means	to	pay	reparation	for	colonial	nor	for	neo-colonial	injustices	because	not	all	states	that	have	claims	to	reparation	can	profit	from	this	system.			
Justice	towards	Indigenous	and	Local	Communities	When	the	concept	of	commutative	justice	was	introduced	in	this	article,	I	mentioned	the	procedural	Roman	Law	interpretation	of	commutative	justice,	which	requires	that	both	parties	agree	on	a	transaction.	With	Prior	Informed	Consent	(PIC)	and	Mutually	Agreed	Terms	(MAC)	the	CBD	and	its	NP	suggested	two	tools	that	should	ensure	commutative	justice	in	the	procedural	sense	in	ABS	negotiations.	The	implementation	of	these	procedures	raises	the	questions	of	who	the	involved	parties	should	be	and	how	they	can	be	fairly	integrated	into	the	process.	As	international	treaties,	the	CBD	and	NP	proceed	from	the	assumption	of	the	sovereign	states	as	the	involved	parties.	However,	the	CBD	and	NP	also	emphasize	that	indigenous	and	local	communities	should	be	considered.																																																									11	This	understanding	can	be	traced	back	to	Thomas	Aquinas’	interpretation	of	Aristotle.	As	mentioned	before,	Aristotle	divides	particular	justice	into	distributive	justice	(διανεµετικον δικαιον,	dianemetikon	dikaion)	and	what	is	usually	called	“corrective	justice”	(διορθοτικον δικαιον,	diorthotikon	dikaion)	(Aristotle,	1992:	Book	V).	In	his	interpretation	of	Aristotle,	Thomas	Aquinas	opposes	distributive	justice	(iustitia	distributiva)	to	commutative	justice	(iustitia	commutativa),	in	which	he	includes	reparation	as	well	as	e.g.	commercial	exchange	(Aquinas,	1993:	II-II,	Q61).	
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The	NP	has	been	the	first	international	treaty	that	explicitly	notes	the	UN	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	(Greiber	et	al.,	2012:	p55;	Tobin,	2013),	and	it	highlights	that	indigenous	and	local	people	should	be	involved	in	MAT	and	PIC	processes.	The	principle	of	Free	Prior	Informed	Consent	(FPIC),	which	is	usually	treated	as	a	synonym	for	PIC,	is	an	established	tool	for	interaction	with	minorities	(Pillay,	2013).	It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	when	the	NP	states	that	parties	shall	consider	indigenous	and	local	communities,	qualifying	language	is	applied.	For	instance,	in	articles	5,	6,	7,	12,	this	request	is	complemented	by	the	phrase	“in	accordance	with	domestic	law,	each	party	shall	[…]”	or	articles	11,	12	request	that	“each	party	shall	endeavour	[…],	as	appropriate	[…].”	Such	language	leaves	room	for	an	interpretation	that	the	respective	national	government	can	decide	to	what	extent	indigenous	and	local	communities	are	involved	in	the	process	(Greiber	et	al.,	2012:	p100;	Tobin,	2013).	As	this	is	not	directly	a	question	of	commutative	justice	but	rather	of	recognition	justice	or	participatory	justice,	it	would	go	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	examine	in	detail	whether	the	CBD	and	its	NP	are	just	in	how	they	involve	and	respect	indigenous	and	local	communities.			
Distributive	Justice		Finally,	I	would	like	to	add	a	few	thoughts	concerning	the	classical	counterpart	to	commutative	justice,	namely	distributive	justice.	In	the	literature	on	global	justice,	there	is	a	broad	discussion	on	how	natural	resources	and	benefits	deriving	from	them	should	be	distributed	worldwide	(e.g.	Caney,	2001).	In	the	context	of	genetic	resources,	the	argument	for	a	global	distribution	of	at	least	some	benefits	can	be	supported	by	reference	to	their	particular	non-material	informative	nature,	due	to	which	genetic	resources	could	be	considered	as	a	public	and	a	common	good	(De	Jonge,	2011).	However,	as	discussed	above,	history	has	shown	that	making	genetic	resources	freely	available	to	actors	in	all	states,	de	facto	favoured	Northern	companies	with	more	funds	available	to	invest.	As	a	result,	people	from	the	global	North	benefited	from	genetic	resources,	whereas	those	in	the	South	ended	up	empty	handed.	Joseph	Millum	refers	to	distributive	justice	to	argue	for	property	rights	over	biodiversity,	which,	in	turn,	could	legitimize	ABS	based	on	the	second	scenario	described	above.	In	that	sense,	he	combines	aims	and	requirements	of	distributive	and	commutative	justice.	Millum	speaks	of	a	justification	based	on	instrumental	accounts,	according	to	which	underprivileged	indigenous	communities	should	have	property	rights	over	the	areas	of	biodiversity	that	
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they	occupy.	He	argues	that	this	would	be	instrumental	to	achieve	distributive	justice	(Millum,	2010).	However,	his	approach	towards	distributive	justice	only	improves	the	situation	of	those	poor	indigenous	communities	who	occupy	areas	with	a	high	incidence	of	biodiversity.	Poverty	in	urban	areas	such	as	slums	would	not	be	affected	by	this	approach.	A	more	comprehensive	approach	that	focuses	on	a	more	just	and	equal	global	distribution	of	benefits	from	genetic	resources	seems	to	be	more	effective	as	an	instrument	to	achieve	distributive	justice	rather	than	assigning	property	rights	to	certain	disadvantaged	communities.	Distributive	justice	seems	to	request	that	the	users	of	genetic	resources	share	some	of	the	benefits	that	they	draw	from	natural	genetic	information	with	the	rest	of	the	world.	In	this	sense,	those	who	profit	from	genetic	resources	could	for	instance	be	asked	to	pay	into	a	global	fund,	which	could	be	employed	for	the	common	good.		
	
Conclusion	This	essay	aimed	at	contributing	to	a	critical	discussion	of	ABS	as	a	tool	to	promote	commutative	justice.	For	this	purpose	the	essay	addressed	the	question	of	what	it	is	that	providers	of	genetic	resources	are	being	compensated	for.	Potential	compensation-claims	have	been	exemplified	using	four	general	scenarios,	which	were	derived	from	the	text	and	context	of	the	CBD	and	its	NP.	Although	ABS	is	often	understood	as	contributing	towards	commutative	justice,	the	argumentation	in	this	essay	suggests	that	the	notion	that	provider	states	have	particular	claims	to	genetic	resources	on	their	territory,	and	that	they	thus	must	be	compensated	whenever	genetic	resources	are	used,	is	highly	problematic.	However,	the	essay	also	argues	that	the	international	community	does	have	moral	duties	to	compensate	those	states,	which	comply	with	the	requests	set	out	in	the	first	and	second	objective	of	the	CBD.	The	setting	of	the	ABS	system	as	dealing	with	the	third	objective	of	the	CBD	indicates	that	it	is	understood	as	a	compensation	for	biodiversity	conservation.	In	this	regard,	this	essay	welcomes	the	support	and	ratification	of	the	NP	as	an	important	step	in	recognizing	these	duties.	Moreover,	requests	for	biodiversity-conservation	and	the	issue	of	dealing	with	benefits	from	genetic	resources	raise	justice	questions	beyond	the	dimension	of	commutative	justice.	Again,	it	is	an	achievement	that	the	NP	triggers	a	discussion	and	raises	the	awareness	of	these	issues.	However,	it	is	important	that	the	ratifying	parties	are	aware	of	the	moral	problems	discussed	in	this	essay	and	the	risks	associated	with	them.	If	the	arguments	brought	forward	in	this	essay	are	correct,	the	following	three	recommendations	should	
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be	considered	on	the	one	hand,	for	the	implementation	of	the	Nagoya	protocol	into	domestic	legislation	of	ratifying	states;	on	the	other	hand,	in	specific	ABS	negotiations:	First,	the	essay	recommends	that	particular	attention	should	be	given	to	negotiations	in	which	traditional	knowledge	or	active	contribution	by	local	breeders	is	involved.	These	are	the	cases	in	which	commutative	justice	in	the	classical	sense	requests	compensation	for	the	providers.		Second,	in	cases	where	providers	of	genetic	resources	simply	allow	the	user-party	to	enter	state	territory	in	order	to	collect,	for	instance,	a	sample	of	a	natural	plant,	modesty	with	respect	to	benefit-claims	seems	to	be	appropriate.	This	is	particularly	true	for	utilizers	in	non-commercial	research,	where	excessive	benefit-claims	by	provider	states	may	hinder	collaborations	and	harm	research	in	providing	as	well	as	utilizing	states.		Third,	mechanisms	should	be	introduced	that	allow	those	states	that	make	an	effort	towards	conservation	of	biodiversity	and	sustainable	development	to	be	compensated	for	this	effort	even	if	they	are	not	involved	in	any	ABS	negotiations	for	genetic	resources.			
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